Analysis of Cyber Security Methodologies: A Direct Comparison of Current Versus Possible DoD Cyber Assets
AbstractRecent years and modern warfare have shown an increasing reliance on the cyber domain to maintain national and military operability, resulting in cyber exploits having a more profound impact on victim nations. As the United States seeks to maximize its ability to capitalize on these exploits and minimize its susceptibility, a decision must be made on the most effective way to accomplish these tasks. Currently, each major department within the Department of Defense (DoD) are methodically building up their own cyber assets to accomplish these tasks as they relate to their traditional domain. There has been a recent proposal to do away with this system structure and instead create a separate Cyber Department, on the same level as the Army, Navy, etc. This paper evaluates the comparative value between the two proposals through value modeling. The value model is based on each alternative’s ability to achieve the end state cyber goals of the DoD and the nation as a whole. Strong indicators point towards a separate Cyber Department as the most valuable alternative available to achieve the nation’s goals, and that there are current weaknesses within our current cyber structure that are open for exploitation.
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